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actions. Will the Canadian Courts express the view that since
Simonin v. Nalcc was wrongly decided, when there is no foundation
for jurisdiction in either a void or voidable marriage based on
celebration within the jurisdiction thus overruling Spencer v. Ladd59
and Reid v. Francis?60 Will the Canadian courts overrule the decision
in Gower v. Starrett61 and draw a distinction between void and
voidable marriages and hold, as did the House of Lords, that
there is no jurisdiction on the basis of celebration within the juris-
diction in the case of a voidable marriage? Or will subsequent
Canadian decisions adopt the reasoning in Gower v. Starrett62 and
find no distinction between void and voidable marriages and further
hold that though the "rule" in Simonin's case, though wrongly de-
cided, is to be applied in both void and voidable marriages? The
final question raised is whether or not the Ontario courts will reverse
their earlier position 63 and subsequently assume jurisdiction on the
basis of residence or even celebration within the province or whether
they will continue to limit their jurisdiction in voidable marriages
to the sole ground of domicile within the province? It is submitted
that in view of the fact that the analogy between divorce and voidable
marriages expressed in Inverclyde v. Inverclyde64 and followed in
Fleming v. Fleming65 was disapproved of in Ramsay-Fairfax v.
Ramsay-Fairfax66 the Ontario courts will be less reluctant to extend
their jurisdiction in nullity actions especially since the House of
Lords has held Inverclyde v. Inverclyde67 to be wrong insofar as it
refused to recognize residence as a grounds for jurisdiction.68 The
approach to be eventually taken by the Canadian courts and the
effect of the Ross-Smith decision on this approach must be patiently
awaited until the issues are raised before them.
RON RuBiNoFFO
HARTLEY NATHAN"
FELDSTEIN VS. ALLOY MTETAL SALES LTD.-NEGLIGENCE--VICARIOUS
LIABiLrrY-GRATuITous PASSENGERS-SECTION 105, ONTARIO HIGH-
WAY TRAFFIc Act-An article, Section 105: Ontario Highway Traffic
Act in Volume 2, Part 3 of the Osgoode Hall Law Journal'
briefly reviewed the operation of the "gratuitous passenger" section
of the Ontario Highway Traffic Act2 placing special emphasis on the
5 9 Supra, footnote 50.
60 Supra, footnote 52.
61 Supra, footnote 51.
6 2 Supra, footnote 51.
63 Fleming v. Fleming [1934] 0.1 588.
6 4 Supra, footnote 54.
65 Supra, footnote 63.
6 6 Supra, footnote 57.
67 Supra, footnote 54.6s Ross-Smith v. Ross-Smith [1962J 1 All E.R. 344, p. 354.
*Messrs. Rubinoff and Nathan are in the third year at Osgoode Hall
Law School.
12 O.H.L.J. (1961-62) p. 322.
2 lS.O. 1960, c. 172, s. 105.
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decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Harrison v. Toronto Motor
(ar and Krug.3
In a recent decision, Feldstein v. Alloy Metal Sales Ltd. and
Mathews,4 Mr. Justice Ferguson was faced with an almost identical
factual situation as was the Ontario Court of Appeal in the Harrison
case but he came to an opposite conclusion.
The facts of the Feldstein case can be set out briefly. Mrs.
Feldstein, an employee of Alloy Metal Sales was injured while a
passenger in one of her employer's automobiles. Alloy's office was
located some distance from downtown Toronto and it was the com-
pany's policy to provide free transportation service for employees
who wished to shop downtown during their lunch hour. The co-
defendant, Mathews, a servant of Alloy Metal, was employed as a
chauffeur to drive the company station wagon on these noon-hour
excursions. Mrs. Feldstein was found to have been injured as a result
of the negligence of Mathews, and he in turn was found to have been
acting within the scope of his duties at the relevant time.
Section 105 of the Highway Traffic Act provides as follows:
105(1) The owner of a motor vehicle is liable for loss or damage sus-
tained by any person by reason of negligence in the operation of the
motor vehicle on a highway unless the motor vehicle was without the
owner's consent in the possession of some person other than the owner
or his chauffeur, and the driver of a motor vehicle not being the owner
is liable to the same extent as the owner.
105(2) Notwithstanding subsection I, the owner or driver of a motor
vehicle, other than a vehicle operated in the business of carrying pas-
sengers for compensation, is not liable for any loss or damage resulting
from bodily injury to, or the death of any person being carried in, or
upon, or entering, or getting on to, or alighting from the motor vehicle.
Section 105 (1) generally imposes a statutory vicarious liability upon
the owner of a motor vehicle for loss or damage occasioned by the
negligence of the driver of such motor vehicle. Section 105(2) in
general exempts the owner and driver from liability where the injury
is sustained by a passenger being carried in a vehicle "not operated
in the business of carrying passengers for compensation."
The courts have found exceptions to the bar in 105(2) in three
sets of circumstances summarily stated as follows: 5
(1) Where there is a term of safe carriage in a private contract
105 (2) will not bar the claim of the injured passenger.6
(2) Where a servant-passenger is injured while in the course of
his employment due to a master-owner's negligence in operating his
motor vehicle, 105 (2) does not bar the claim.7
3 [1945] 1 D.L.R. 286, [1945] O.R. 1. See also C. A. Wright (1945), 23
Can. B. Rev. 344, and J. D. Morton (1958), 36 Can. B. Rev., p. 414.
4 [1962] O.R. 476.
5 Supr, footnote 1 at p. 332.6 Dorosz & Dorosz v. Kock, 28 D.L.R. (2d) 171. [1961] O.R. 422, affd.
31 D.L.R. (2d) 139.
7 Duchaine v. Armstrong d Legault [1957] O.W.N. 251.
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(3) Where there is a previously existing common law right,
such as a master's vicarious liability for the torts of his servant
committed during the course of his employment, 105(2) does not
bar the cause of action against the master.8
In the light of the foregoing summary and factual situation, the
Feldstein decision can be reviewed. The basis of Mrs. Feldstein's
claim is stated by Mr. Justice Ferguson as follows: 9
The plaintiff's counsel puts her case on four grounds. Firstly she was
an employee of the defendant, Alloy Metal, at the time of the accident,
and that she has, as an employee, a cause of action against her employer
by virtue of s. 121 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, R.S.O. 1950, c.
430 [now s. 124, R.S.O. 1960, c. 437). Secondly, she was being carried
pursuant to an express contract and not gratuitously. Thirdly, s. 50(2)
is not a bar to the action because the plaintiff was a servant of the
defendant Alloy at the time and as a servant she has a cause of action
against her master for negligence. Fourthly, the defendants cannot avail
themselves of the provisions of s. 50(2) because the vehicle does not
come within the exception mentioned, as it was in the plaintiff's con-
tention, a vehicle carrying passengers for compensation.lO
The first claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act was
dismissed. Mrs. Feldstein's second claim based on a contract of car-
riage was also denied, Mr. Justice Ferguson relying upon Jurasts v.
Nemes' held that it was not sufficient for the contract of carriage
to arise incidentally from the contract of employment. The "baby-
sitter" case 2 in which liability was visited on the basis of contract
was distinguished.' 3 The third claim as stated by Mr. Justice Ferguson
seems to rely on a master's direct liability for the safety of his servant.
It is submitted that this claim was rightly dismissed if based on a
previously existing common law liability of a master for the safety
of his servant since no such duty exists. The fourth claim was dis-
missed on the basis of a statement made by Mr. Justice Laidlaw in
Jurasits v. Nemes.14 In that case it was held that the test of whether
or not a vehicle was being operated in the business of carrying pas-
sengers for compensation was to consider the real and primary
object of operating the motor vehicle. Mr. Justice Ferguson found
that the real and primary object of operating the company station
wagon was not to carry passengers for compensation and therefore
it did not fall within the exception to s. 105 (2).
What is difficult to understand is why Mrs. Feldstein was unable
to recover on the same basis as did Miss Harrison in Harrison v.
Toronto Motor Car and K=g'5 namely, on the basis of a master's
liability for the negligence of his servant while in the course of his
SHarrison v. Toronto Motor Car and Krug, supra, footnote 3.
9 [1962) O.R 476 at p. 479.
10 It is to be noted that section 50(2) referred to by Mr. Justice Ferguson
is now section 105(2), Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 172.
11 (1957) 8 D.L.R-. (2d) 659, [19571 O.W.N. 166.
12 Dorosz & Dorosz v. Koch, supra, footnote 6.
13 See A. M. Linden (1962) 40 Can. B. Rev. 284, for a discussion of this
claim dealt with in previous cases.
14 (1957) 8 D.L.RL (2d) 659 at page 666.15 Supra, footnote 3.
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employment. In that case, Miss Harrison was a nurse being carried
in a motor vehicle driven by a servant of the defendant Krug, the
master of the plaintiff nurse. She was injured due to the negligence
of the driver while he was in the course of his employment. The
Harrison decision turned on the vicarious liability of the master for
the negligence of his servant, the driver. The court reasoned that
sec. 105 (2) was to be strictly construed and therefore did not abrogate
any existing common-law rights. The distinguishing facts in the
Harrison case, namely that the employer Krug was present in the
automobile and that Miss Harrison was in the course of her employ-
ment were held to be immaterial to the decision. It was decided
solely on the basis of vicarious liability, the existing common law
right held not to be abrogated by s. 105(2). These facts being im-
material, Mrs. Feldstein was therefore in the same position as Miss
Harrison. They both were passengers in a vehicle operated by a
driver, employed by the owner of the vehicle, and both were injured
by the negligence of the driver in the course of his employment. It
is submitted that there is no distinction between the two cases and
in fact none is made in the judgment. Mr. Justice Ferguson merely
mentioned the Harrison case, albeit with approval, and then set it
aside without further comment.
The doctrine of precedent and stare decisis is a fundamental
principle in Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence. When faced with a prior
decision of his own appellate court on the same point of law, a trial
judge is obligated either to follow that decision or to make a careful
distinction in coming to a contrary result. As anomalous as the
Harrison decision might appear to be, that in itself is not sufficient
to justify a contrary decision.
1 6
C. R. BALL*
RUNNYmEDE IRON & STEEL VS. ROSSEN ENGINEERING & CONSTRUCTION
Co. LTD.-SALE OF GOODS-MIXED SHIPMENTS OF GOODS OF A DIF-
FERENT DESCRIPTION-SECTION 29(3) ONTARIO SALE OF GOODS ACT-
The purpose of this comment is to consider the effect of the recent
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Runnymede Iron & Steel
Ltd. v. Rossen Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd.1 on the law in
relation to the sale of goods in Ontario. The facts were that Runny-
mede Iron made a contract with Rossen whereby the former was to
purchase all the "relaying rail" obtained from a salvage operation
being carried out by the latter at Hawk Lake. It is of some importance
that it was conceded that the contract was one for the sale of goods
by description and that the description was "relaying rails." After
16It is to be noted that no appeal was taken from this decision, as a
settlement was made out of court.
*Mr. Ball Is in the third year at Osgoode Hall Law School.
1 (1962), 30 D.L.R. (2d) 410 (S.C.C.), revg. [19542 O.R. 153 (Ont. CA.).
1963]
